The Evolution of the CJEU’s Case Law on Stem Cell Patents::Context, Outcome and Implications of Case C‑364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation. by Minssen, Timo & Nordberg, Ana
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
The Evolution of the CJEU’s Case Law on Stem Cell Patents:
Minssen, Timo; Nordberg, Ana
Published in:
N I R
Publication date:
2015
Citation for published version (APA):
Minssen, T., & Nordberg, A. (2015). The Evolution of the CJEU’s Case Law on Stem Cell Patents: Context,
Outcome and Implications of Case C364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation. N I R, 2015(5), 493-503.
Download date: 03. Feb. 2020
Forthcoming in Nordic Intellectual Property Law Review (NIR), Issue 5 (2015). 
Side 1 af 10 
 
The evolution of the CJEU’s case law on stem cell patents: 
Context, outcome and implications of Case C‑364/13 
International Stem Cell Corporation.  
 
Timo Minssen∗  & Ana Nordberg∗∗  
 
 
Abstract∗∗∗: On December, 18th 2014 the CJEU rendered its’ much-anticipated decision 
in C‑364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation v Comptroller General of Patents 
(ISCC). Qualifying its’ earlier ruling in Brüstle v. Greenpeace (Brüstle) with regard to 
non-fertilised human ova stimulated by parthenogenesis, the Court held that in order 
to constitute a ‘human embryo’ - and thus to be unpatentable under the EU 
Biotechnology Directive - the stimulated ovum must have the “inherent capacity to 
develop into a human being”. This would allow patent claims on pluripotent 
parthenotes which had not been genetically modified to achieve totipotent capabilities. 
Hence the judgment establishes a crucial limitation of the broad interpretation of 
“human embryos” in Brüstle, where the CJEU held that parthenotes are covered by the 
term “human embryo” since they are “capable of commencing the process of development 
of a human being”. The ISCC decision is to be welcomed since it provides an ethically 
justifiable leeway for patenting and offers reasonable support to the commercial 
viability of European cell therapy research. Yet, ISCC’s impact still depends on 
national implementations and the decision only applies to certain hESC cells. Thus, 
further clarifications would be helpful concerning other non-totipotent hESCs. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
On December, 18th 2014 the CJEU rendered a much-anticipated decision concerning 
the patentability of Human Embryonic Stem Cells (hESC) and the interpretation of 
Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44/EC on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological 
Inventions (Biotech Directive). In Case C‑364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation v 
Comptroller General of Patents (ISCC) the CJEU revisited the issue of patentability of 
hESC and qualified its earlier ruling in Case C-34/10 Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace eV 
(Brüstle) as far as it concerns non-fertilised human ova stimulated by parthenogenesis1. 
                                                          
∗ Associate Professor, LL.D., LL.M. & M.I.C.L., Centre for Information and Innovation Law, University of 
Copenhagen, Denmark.  
∗∗ Post Doc, PhD, LL.M., Centre for Information and Innovation Law, University of Copenhagen, 
Denmark. 
∗∗∗ This paper has been submitted on 6 March 2015. Any changes that happened after this date could not 
be considered. 
1 The term “parthenogenesis” is derived from the Greek words parthenos or "virgin" and genesis or 
"creation”. Most simply it can be defined as reproduction without fertilization. It occurs when a female 
gamete develops a new individual without being fertilized by a male gamete. Parthenogenesis solely 
involves the production and stimulation of a female egg. For further information and illustrations, see: 
Regina Bailey, Parthenogenesis Reproduction Without Fertilization, available at: 
http://biology.about.com/od/geneticsglossary/g/parthenogenesis.htm  (accessed 10 March 2015). 
Regarding recent scientific developments see also: Daughtry, Brittany, and Shoukhrat Mitalipov. Concise 
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In ISCC, the Court now held that in order to constitute a ‘human embryo’ - and thus to 
be considered non-patentable under the Biotech Directive - the stimulated ovum must 
have the “inherent capacity to develop into a human being”. This may allow patent 
claims on pluripotent parthenotes2 which have not been genetically modified to achieve 
totipotent capabilities and thus cannot be considered to contain the inherent capacity to 
develop into a human being. Hence, we argue that the judgment establishes an 
important limitation of the broader interpretation of “human embryos” previously 
established in the Brüstle case, where the CJEU had held that parthenotes are covered 
by the term “human embryo” since they are “capable of commencing the process of 
development of a human being”. At the same time, however, we recognize that the 
judgment will – despite its general legal significance – probably only directly affect a 
rather small number of patent applications. Moreover, we contend that much 
uncertainty still remains on the patentability of pluripotent stem cell technology, which 
will require further legal and judicial clarifications.  
 
To this end, section 1 will set out with a brief overview of the legal framework and state 
of the debate prior to the CJEU’s decision in ISCC. In sections 2 and 3 we will outline 
the facts and the procedural history of this important case. Section 4 summarizes the 
outcome and the relevant legal essence of the CJEU’s decision. Section 5 will analyse 
the legal implications that can be derived from this decision and identify unsolved 
questions. This will allow us to finally formulate some concluding remarks in section 6. 
 
 
1. Brief background of Case C‑364/13: The Biotech Directive and the Brüstle 
case 
 
The EU Directive 98/44 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions aims to 
balance the protection of dignity and integrity of the human being3 with the need to 
preserve the social function of patents as a vector for the competiveness of European 
biotech industry.4 Hence, Article 6 (2) (c) of the Biotech Directive explicitly prohibits 
patenting the uses of embryos for industrial or commercial purposes where such use 
would be contrary to ordre public or morality. However, since the drafters of the 
Biotech Directive could not foresee the full implications and opportunities of modern 
stem cell science, the broad wording of the provision raises many questions with regard 
to the patentability of human embryonic stem cell (hESC) technology. Totipotent5 
embryonic stem-cells can be understood as a stage in the formation and development of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Review: Parthenote Stem Cells for Regenerative Medicine: Genetic, Epigenetic, and Developmental 
Features, Stem Cells Translational Medicine 3.3 (2014): 290–298. 
2 A parthenote is a cell resulting from parthenogenesis. This may involve a 1.  An embryo generated 
through parthenogenesis, occurring in certain plants and invertebrate animals, or, 2.  An unfertilized, 
usually mammalian egg cell that has been artificially activated with chemicals so that it divides. 
3 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection 
of biotechnological inventions OJ 1998 L213 (Biotech Directive), recital 16. 
4 Biotech Directive (n 1), recitals 1-3 & 17. 
5 Totipotent stem cells are the most versatile of the stem cell types. When a sperm cell and an egg cell 
unite, they form a one-celled fertilized egg. This cell is totipotent, meaning it has the potential to give 
rise to any and all human cells, such as brain, liver, blood or heart cells. It can even give rise to an entire 
functional organism. The first few cell divisions in embryonic development produce more totipotent cells. 
After four days of embryonic cell division, the cells begin to specialize into pluripotent stem cells. 
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the human body and thus they fall unequivocally both under the patentability 
prohibitions set forth in article 5 (1) of the Biotech Directive (a subject-matter exclusion 
rule) and under Article 6 (2) (c) of the Biotech Directive.6 The questions of patentability 
raised by pluripotent7 stem cell technology are, however, more complex. For many 
years it remained rather unclear how this prohibition relates to pluripotent human 
embryonic stem cell technology and the methods by which such stem cells are created.  
 
Some of these questions were answered in October 2011, when the CJEU rendered its’ 
judgment in Brüstle v. Greenpeace8 and broadly interpreted the patent’s exclusion of 
human embryos for use in commercial or industrial purposes. Adopting a full history 
approach the Court held inter alia that, Article 6 (2) (c) of the Biotech Directive 
excluded from patentability an invention where the technical teaching of the patent 
application requires the prior destruction of human embryos or their use as base 
material, whenever such destruction takes place and even if the claims’ description does 
not refer to the use of human embryos. Moreover, the Court widely defined the notion 
of human embryo as:  
 
“[A]ny human ovum after fertilization, any non-fertilized human ovum into 
which the cell nucleus from a mature human cell has been transplanted and 
any nonfertilized human ovum whose division and further development 
have been stimulated by parthenogenesis.”  
 
The Court thus explicitly included non-fertilized ova after somatic cell nuclear transfer 
(SCNT)9 and – most importantly for this case - parthenotes, which are created by the 
artificial activation of an oocyte by a variety of chemical and electrical techniques so 
there are capable of further cell-division in absence of sperm-fertilization. 
 
In the wake of Brüstle scientists in the field of hESC research became very much 
concerned about the wider impact of this controversial decision as it prohibits hESC 
patents that use publicly available stem cell lines that could be obtained in the United 
States or Asia, and thus would not imply de novo destruction of embryos. These worries 
were partially confirmed, when the EPO directly incorporated the Brüstle principles 
into its’ Examination Guidelines10 and began to reject patent claims11 that would 
                                                          
6 Biotech Directive (n 1), Article 5 (1).   
7 These cells are like totipotent stem cells in that they can give rise to all tissue types. Unlike totipotent 
stem cells, however, they cannot give rise to an entire organism. On the fourth day of development, the 
embryo forms into two layers, an outer layer which will become the placenta, and an inner mass which 
will form the tissues of the developing human body. These inner cells, though they can form nearly any 
human tissue, cannot do so without the outer layer; so are not totipotent, but pluripotent. As these 
pluripotent stem cells continue to divide, they begin to specialize further. 
8 Case C-34/10, Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace eV, EU:C:2011:669. 
9 “Somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) is a technique for cloning. The nucleus is removed from a healthy 
egg. This egg becomes the host for a nucleus that is transplanted from another cell, such as a skin cell. 
The resulting embryo can be used to generate embryonic stem cells with a genetic match to the nucleus 
donor (therapeutic cloning), or can be implanted into a surrogate mother to create a cloned individual, 
such as Dolly the sheep (reproductive cloning).” This definition is available at: 
 https://www.hhmi.org/biointeractive/somatic-cell-nuclear-transfer-animation (accessed 5 March 2015)- 
10 Cf. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office (November 2014 edition), Part G, 
Chapter II-17 to 18 on R 28 (c), available at: http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/guidelines.html 
(accessed 5 March 2015). 
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arguably have been accepted under the EPO’s previous more pragmatic approach 
resulting from the Enlarged Board of Appeal decision in WARF.12   
 
However, when the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof – BGH)13 
applied the CJEU’s preliminary ruling in Brüstle and delivered its’ much awaited final 
decision in the Brüstle case on 27 November 201214, it became apparent that, 
surprisingly, the BGH did not apply the prior CJEU considerations in a narrow and 
strict manner. Interpreting the CJEU’s explanations in a rather patent-friendly way, 
the BGH decided to only partially revoke Oliver Brüstle’s patent. It determined that 
the patenting of the process is only excluded according to § 2 Section 1 No. 3 of the 
Patents Act, if the process includes the prior destruction of embryos or their use as 
source material. Patenting is possible, however, where the relevant stem cells were 
extracted without necessitating the destruction of embryos. Also, the use of cell lines 
extracted from embryos that are no longer able to develop does – according to the BGH 
– not result in the exclusion of patentability. The negotiated patent claim was, in this 
respect, limited, and the appeal was only partially rejected. Amending this decision 
with a disclaimer the BGH appeared also to be willing to consider later (post-filing)  
technological developments that allowed the extraction of stem cells (e.g. through 
optimized “blastomere separation”) without necessarily destroying the embryo in the 
process. While the final BGH decision indicated that a reasonable and relatively broad 
patent protection on human stem cell-related technology is still possible in Germany, it 
also raised crucial questions about a potential “misinterpretation” of the CJEU’s 
preliminary ruling and a potential conflict with the present approach taken at the 
European Patent Office (EPO).  
 
Meanwhile, UK courts were also struggling with the precise scope and implications of 
the CJEU’s findings in Brüstle. One of the most controversial issues concerned the 
applicability of the CJEU’s Brüstle decision with regard to human parthenotes. This 
uncertainty resulted in a referral from the High Court of Justice of England and Wales, 
Chancery Division (Patents Court), which finally offered the CJEU an opportunity to 
reconsider the interpretation of the concept of ‘human embryos’ in article 6(2)(c) of the 
Biotech Directive15 with regard to human parthenotes. The specific question under 
referral in Case C-364/13, International Stem Cell Corporation16 asks for a clarification 
of whether the CJEU ruling in Brüstle17 applies without distinction to unfertilised 
human ova stimulated by parthenogenesis, which contains only pluripotent cells and 
are not capable of developing beyond the blastocyst stage. The CJEU decision was 
anticipated with a mix of hope and fear by the interested circles. Would the highest EU 
court confirm or distinguish Brüstle? 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
11 See e.g. EPO, Boards of Appeal in T2221/10 Technion/Culturing cells [04.02.2014] unpublished. Cf. the 
detailed analysis by Mahalatchimy, A. et al., The Impact of European embryonic stem cell patent 
decisions on research strategies, Nature Biotechnology, Volume 33, Number 1 (January 2015), pp. 41-43.  
12 EPO, Enlarged Board of Appeal in G-2/06 WARF/ Use of embryos [25.11.2008] OJ EPO 2009, 306 
13 The BGH is Germany’s highest court of civil and criminal jurisdiction. 
14 BGH Decision of 27 November 2012, case no.: X ZR 58/07. 
15 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions OJ 1998 L213, p.13 (Biotech Directive). 
16 Case C-364/13, International Stem Cell Corporation v Comptroller General of Patents, EU:C:2014:2451. 
17 Case C-34/10 (n 6).   
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2.  Facts of the case  
 
This case can be traced back to the decision by the UK Intellectual Property Office 
(UKIPO) to refuse two UK patent applications. Both were initially filed on 23 October 
2006 in the name of LifeLine Cell Technology, and later assigned to International Stem 
Cell Corporation (ISCC), a California-based publicly traded biotechnology company.18 
The two patent applications relate to the research results of  a parthenogenesis based 
stem cell technology. The concerned patent applications included claims to (1) methods 
of producing pluripotent human stem cell lines from parthenogenetically-activated 
oocytes and stem cells produced according to the claimed methods Claims 1 to 29 (as 
proposed to be amended) concern methods of producing pluripotent human stem cell 
lines from parthenogenetically-activated oocytes, claims 30 and 31 refer to stem cell 
lines produced according to the method claimed, and claim 32 is an omnibus claim 
concerned with a stem cell line;19 and (2) methods of producing synthetic cornea or 
corneal tissue, all involving the isolation of pluripotent stem cells from 
parthogenetically-activated oocytes, followed by product-by-process claims relating to 
synthetic cornea or corneal tissue produced by these methods and an omnibus claim.20 
 
During the course of patent prosecution at the UKIPO objections to patentability 
emerged, as the hearing officer considered that the inventions disclosed in the patent 
application were excluded from patentability due to constituting uses of human 
embryos under paragraph 3(d) of Schedule A” of the Patents Act 1977, a rule that 
implements Article 6(2)(c) of the Biotech Directive.21 Confronted with such objections, 
ISCC argued that the Brüstle decision should not apply, because the claimed inventions 
relate to parthenogenetically-activated oocytes and these are incapable of initiating the 
process of development of a human being due to the phenomenon of genomic 
imprinting. Confronted with research that suggested based on empirical evident in 
animal models that such hurdles could be successfully overcome by genetic engineering, 
ISC amended the claims introducing the word ‘pluripotent’ before ‘human stem cell 
line’ and referring to a lack of paternal imprinting, thus excluding any such method of 
genetic manipulation.22 
 
The arguments failed to persuade the patent office. The patents were refused under the 
reasoning that the inventions disclosed in the patent applications concerned uses of 
human embryos pursuant to CJEU jurisprudence in Brüstle.23 ISCC appealed to the 
High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Chancery Division (the Patents Court), 
which in addition to its first instance jurisdiction, also hears several types of appeals 
including appeals from decisions of the UK Intellectual Property Office.  
 
                                                          
18 Cf. http://www.internationalstemcell.com/Company [accessed, 25 February 2015]. 
19 Application GB0621068.6 entitled ‘Parthenogenetic activation of oocytes for the production of human 
embryonic stem cells’. 
20 Application GB0621069.4 entitled ‘Synthetic cornea from retinal stem cells’. 
21 Biotech Directive (n 1).  
22 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, delivered on 17 July 2014, Case C-364/13, International 
Stem Cell v Comptroller General of Patents, para 15. 
23 Comptroller General of Patents Decision n. BL O/316/12. 
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3. The referral  
 
The Patents Court struggled with applying the CJEU jurisprudence set out in Brüstle 
to the facts of the case and decided to stay the proceedings in order to ask the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU. During the procedures scientific evidence 
emerged that distinguished parthenotes from fertilised ova, differentiating the factual 
findings from those presented in Brüstle. The Patents Court relied on technical 
evidence contained in the expert reports and exhibits referred to in the appealed 
decision, as well as evidence presented in the German BGH Brüstle case,24 and also the 
findings of fact made by the hearing officer, being that these were accepted by all 
parties and not challenged under the appeal proceedings.25 It was accepted that 
parthenogenesis refers to a process of activation of an oocyte, in the absence of sperm, 
conducted through a variety of chemical and electrical techniques. The resultant oocyte 
or parthenote is capable of division and further development into a blastocyst-like 
structure. However, without further genetic manipulations these human parthenotes 
are unable to develop to term due to lacking paternal DNA, necessary for the 
development of extra-embryonic tissue. Unlike fertilised ova and its early stage 
descendent cells, parthenogenesis-activated oocyte cells are – without further 
manipulations - merely pluripotent and never totipotent.26 Evidence examined pointed 
out that, so far, human parthenotes have only been able to develop to the blastocyst 
stage (around 5 days). However, despite concluding that the process ‘will not lead to the 
development of a human being’27 the hearing officer had found that the ‘stimulated 
human oocyte divided in a manner analogous to that of a fertilised human embryo, to 
produce a parthenogenetically -derived structure analogous to that blastocyst stage of 
normal embryonic development’.28 The central legal debate here is whether such 
biological analogy between a parthenogenetically derived structure and the blastocyst 
stage of normal embryonic development justified legal analogy, i.e. similar legal 
treatment, having in consideration that in Brüstle parthenotes were expressly declared 
to be non-patentable human embryos.29 The Comptroller argued that Brüstle could be 
interpreted as concerned more with the commencement of the process of fertilisation 
rather than its outcome, pointing out that the CJEU states that ‘any human ovum 
must, as soon as fertilised, be regarded as a ‘human embryo’’30 thus concluding that the 
decision could be interpreted either broadly focusing merely in the fertilisation act or 
rather requiring such process to be capable of leading to a viable human being.31 
 
ISCC submitted that it was crucial to establish what the CJEU meant by the 
expression ‘capable of commencing the process of development of a human being’ since 
such was the developed test to determine what might constitute a human embryo.32 
Thus, this would require determining if such expression should be interpreted narrowly 
                                                          
24 Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court) decision of 27 November 2012, Case X ZR 58/07. 
25 International Stem Cell Corporation v Comptroller General of Patents [2013] EWHC 807 (Ch) (17 
April 2013), paras 10-22. 
26 ibid, para 18. 
27 ibid, para 21. 
28 ibid, para 22. 
29 Case C-34/10 (n 6), para 39. 
30 Case C-34/10 (n 6), para 35, cf. [2013] EWHC 807 (Ch) (17 April 2013), para 45. 
31 [2013] EWHC 807 (Ch) (17 April 2013), para 50. 
32 ibid, para 50. 
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including only organisms capable of commencing the process, or broadly, i.e. including 
also organisms capable of commencing such process, but incapable of leading to a fully 
human being.33 ISCC argued that the CJEU decision should be interpreted according to 
the narrow understanding.  
 
The Patents Court noted that the factual matrix in the case differed from the facts 
before the CJEU in Brüstle, suggesting that the CJEU may have relied on inaccurate or 
incomplete scientific submissions stating that human parthenotes were in fact capable 
of development into a human embryo. 34 The Patents Court concluded that parthenotes 
are not the same as fertilised ova and that treating them as analogues would defeat the 
purpose of the Biotech Directive, as stated in its recitals, of balancing the need to 
encourage research with the protection of fundamental principles of dignity and 
integrity of the person.35  
 
Against this background the following question was referred to the CJEU: ‘Are 
unfertilised human ova whose division and further development have been stimulated 
by parthenogenesis, and which, in contrast to fertilised ova, contain only pluripotent 
cells and are incapable of developing into human beings included in the term "human 
embryos" in Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44/EC on the Legal Protection of 
Biotechnological Inventions?’36 
 
 
4. The Decision of the CJEU 
 
The CJEU ruled that Article 6(2)(c) Biotech Directive must be interpreted in the sense 
that “an unfertilised human ovum whose division and further development have been 
stimulated by parthenogenesis does not constitutes a ‘human embryo’” under the 
condition that “it does not, in itself, have the inherent capacity of developing into a 
human being”. The decision on whether such condition is fulfilled is left to national 
courts, but the CJEU establishes that the criterion for such evaluation is the “current 
scientific knowledge”.37 Therefore, parthenotes should not be excluded from 
patentability provided that, in light of current scientific knowledge, these are 
considered not capable of developing into a ‘human being’ and therefore not considered 
‘human embryos’ under the Biotech Directive. Particularly, in order to be classified as a 
human embryo, a non-fertilised human ovum must have the inherent capacity of 
developing into a human being.  
 
In order to arrive at this decision the court confirmed Brüstle re-stating that ‘human 
embryo’, insofar as the interpretation of Biotech Directive is concerned, is an 
autonomous EU law concept to be interpreted uniformly and that such concept must be 
                                                          
33 ibid, para 32. 
34 ibid, paras 51 to 54. 
35 ibid, para 58. 
36 ibid, para 59; Reference for a preliminary ruling from High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) 
(United Kingdom) made on 28 June 2013 – International Stem Cell Corporation v Comptroller General of 
Patents (Case C-364/13). 
37 Case C-364/13, EU:C:2014:2451 (n 14), para 39. 
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constructed in a wide sense.38 Concerning the specific interpretation of the ruling in 
Brüstle the CJEU observes that the statement in paragraph 35 of Brüstle, which 
mentioned that any human ovum must, as soon as fertilised be regarded as an embryo 
since fertilisation implies the beginning of the process of development of a human 
being, must be interpreted according to the specification in the subsequent paragraph 
concerning non-fertilised ovum. Here the CJEU clarifies that Brüstle, in paragraph 36 
states that non-fertilised ovum will only be considered human embryos, if found 
“capable of commencing the process of development of a human being just as an embryo 
created by fertilisation of an ovum can do”.39 This critical and controversial expression 
was now interpreted following the opinion of the advocate general,40 which had 
proposed applying a test of ‘inherent capacity’.41 The CJEU concluded that as far as 
non-fertilised ovum is concerned “the mere fact that an organism commences the process 
of development is not sufficient for it to be regarded as a ‘human embryo’”.42 As for the 
reason why parthenotes were considered human embryos in Brüstle, the CJEU 
acknowledged that in Brüstle it based its findings on submitted written observations 
that considered these to be capable of fully development. It is thus, symptomatic that 
this time the CJEU is more cautious leaving for national courts to decide, case-by-case, 
and in accordance with available scientific knowledge on whether an organism is 
inherently capable of developing into a human being.43  
 
 
5. Analysis  
 
The CJEU has skilfully avoided touching the core of Brüstle’s approach declining to 
comment on observations of the referring court which might lead to a re-evaluation of 
the Brüstle doctrine. The decision was thus characterized as a “clarification” of Brüstle, 
and the issue was treated as a matter of factual determination, which was left to the 
national court to decide. Only indirectly, and falling short of actually recognising that 
there was a technical failure, or the court was misdirected or had misunderstood the 
science at issue, did the CJEU recognise that it had relied on incorrect scientific data 
concerning parthenotes in Brüstle. 
 
Although the number of patent applications that directly claim human parthenotes 
may be limited, the broader legal implications of the CJEU’s decision to distinguish 
Brüstle44 nevertheless offers a ray of hope for the patentability of European stem cell 
research. After closing the doors for the patentability of crucial areas human embryonic 
stem cell technology, it appears that ISCC has at least opened a small window infusing 
a breath of fresh air: inventions relating to unfertilised human eggs whose division and 
further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis can once again be 
patented in Europe, i.e. as long as these parthenotes have not been genetically modified 
to achieve an ‘inherent capacity to develop into a human being’. Considering that 
                                                          
38 ibid, paras 23-24. 
39 ibid, paras 23-26.  
40 Opinion of Advocate General, Case C-364/13 (n 21), para 73. 
41 Case C-364/13, EU:C:2014:2451 (n14), paras 23-28. 
42 ibid, para 23-29. 
43 ibid, para 36-38. 
44 Case C-34/10 (n 6).  
Forthcoming in Nordic Intellectual Property Law Review (NIR), Issue 5 (2015). 
Side 9 af 10 
 
promising alternative techniques, such as the re-programming of adult stem cells 
through induced pluripotent stem cell technology, are still immature and need to be 
optimized before they can be safely applied, and bearing in mind that this often still 
requires innovative applications of hESC related technology, this development can only 
be welcomed. However, caveat needs to be added.  
 
First, it remains unclear how the European Patent Office will react and how national 
patent offices will interpret the present decision in practice.45 In that context it is 
important to note that the EPO is not an EU institution. Hence the EPO is not formally 
bound by the Biotech Directive, nor is it obliged to accept the decisions of the CJEU.46 
However, the Administrative Council of the European Patent Office has in September 
1999 introduced several of the relevant provisions of the Biotech Directive into the 
Implementing Regulations to the EPC (the “Rules”).47 This includes Article 6 of the 
Biotech Directive, which is now to be found in Rules 26-29 EPC. As a matter of 
pragmatism and in the interest of harmonization it is therefore to be expected that the 
ISCC decision will be mirrored in the EPO guidelines for examination and 
implemented in the practice of the office, in similarity to the approach followed 
concerning Brüstle. Yet, considering the very strict post- Brüstle position recently taken 
by the EPO in T2221/10 Technion/Culturing cells48 vis-à-vis the more permissible 
earlier approach followed by the EPO after its’ WARF decision (but before Brüstle), it 
remains to be seen  how broadly or narrowly the EPO will interpret and incorporate 
this decision into its’ practice.  
 
Second, at the level of national patent offices and courts divergences might also occur. 
After all, the Court “empowers” the national court to decide whether the parthenote 
has the ‘inherent capacity to develop into a human being’ without providing proper 
guidelines on this "inherency test" and without having established at what point an 
organism develops into a human being and is thus excluded from the concept of ‘human 
embryo’.49 Moreover, and as pointed out by the Advocate General Opinion in ISCC,50 
member states might still decide to ban the patentability of human parthenotes in 
accordance with the more general exclusion in Article 6 (1) of the Biotech Directive on 
the basis of other grounds of public order and morality. Thus, national courts will have 
to both determine if the parthenote has the “inherent capacity to develop into a human 
being”, and if not, whether it is still prohibited from being patented on grounds of 
                                                          
45 A more detailed comparative discussion of the implications of the case for innovation policy and 
practice is provided in Ana Nordberg & Timo Minssen, A “ray of hope” for European stem cell patents or 
“out of the smog into the fog”?: The CJEU decision in C-364/13 and how it compares to recent US 
developments, (accepted by IIC in September 2015). 
46 This has also been emphasized by the EPO’s Enlarged Board of Appeal in G2/06 WARF/Use of embryos 
[25.11.2008] OJ EPO 2009, 306. 
47 Administrative Council Decision, OJ EPO 7/1999, 437-440. 
48 See e.g. EPO, Boards of Appeal in T2221/10 Technion/Culturing cells [04.02.2014] unpublished. Cf. the 
detailed analysis by Mahalatchimy, A. et al., The Impact of European embryonic stem cell patent 
decisions on research strategies, Nature Biotechnology, Volume 33, Number 1 (January 2015), pp. 41-43. 
49 Cf. Anna Dannreuther, The CJEU clarifies when stem cells can be patented in Europe, available at: 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2014/12/the-cjeu-clarifies-when-stem-cells-can.html (accessed 5 March 
2015). 
50 Opinion of Advocate General, Case C-364/13 (n 21), para 43. 
Forthcoming in Nordic Intellectual Property Law Review (NIR), Issue 5 (2015). 
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morality and/or public order.51 In light of the very different positions taken in the 
various EU member states on the definition of embryos and stem cell research as such, 
this persisting discretion entails a great risk for uncertainties and different approaches 
in each member state. While reflecting and acknowledging the differences between EU 
member states, this would be difficult to reconcile with the primary goal of referrals to 
the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU, i.e. to achieve an harmonious interpretation of the 
law. 
 
Third, it is disappointing that no further clarification was given with regard to stem 
cells created through somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT). After all, the CJEU might 
also have misunderstood particular details of these techniques and it could be argued 
that the limitation set forth in ISCC concerning stem cells created through 
parthenogenesis could also apply to stem cells created by SCNT, which do not have the 
“inherent capacity” to develop into a human being. To assess if such an interpretation 
is legally valid would, however, necessitate another preliminary reference to the CJEU.  
 
Further questions that remain unsolved, but which fall outside the scope of this short 
paper, concern e.g. the paradox with regard to European stem cell research regulations 
and the treatment of left-over embryos in in vitro fertilization treatments, as well as 
the division of competences between the CJEU and the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR), which has developed it’s very own case law on the definition of 
embryos.52 
 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
Considering the significance of the Brüstle and ISCC rulings to such important medical 
areas as regenerative medicine and cellular therapy, the persisting legal uncertainty 
and the lack of generally applicable clear guidance is very unfortunate and does not 
serve the goal of a harmonious and effective European legal framework for innovation. 
The more permissive approach applied by the CJEU in ISCC may at this stage only 
apply to a very limited number of patents and patent applications. Nonetheless, the 
broader legal implications of the ISCC ruling appear at least to be a first step into the 
right direction. Ultimately this might lead to more nuanced approaches providing a 
reasonable leeway for patenting innovative products, methods and applications 
resulting from this promising technology. Hence, the ISCC decision might indeed have 
the “inherent capacity” of developing into a reasonable doctrine on stem cell patenting. 
  
                                                          
51 Ibid.  
52 These questions and further practical implications will be addressed in our 2nd paper, see supra n.45. 
